

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

USLO PEKING

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 0679

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR JA UR

SUBJ: GROMYKO VISIT - JAPANESE ASSESSMENT

REF: TOKYO 199, TOKYO 424, TOKYO 506, TOKYO 581

SUMMARY: FONOFF OFFICIALS DERIVE SATISFACTION, EVEN
RELIEF, FROM REALIZATION THAT THEIR GLOOMY FORECASTS
FOR GROMYKO VISIT HAVE COME TRUE.

THEY BELIEVE THAT JAPANESE INTERESTS

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HAVE BENEFITTED TO SOME DEGREE FROM ALMOST EVERY

POSITION GROMYKO TOOK, WHETHER TOUGH OR CONCILIATORY. HIS INFLEXIBILITY ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES QUESTION ENABLED JAPANESE LEADERS TO ADOPT A HARD LINE IN RESPONSE THAT HAS BEEN POPULAR DOMESTICALLY. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE NOW ABLE TO SAY THAT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT SUCH A HIGH LEVEL IN TOKYO. GROMYKO'S PONDEROUS WARNINGS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN INCLUDING A CLAUSE OPPOSING HEGEMONY IN A PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE PRC GAVE MIKI AND MIYAZAWA A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN THAT SUCH A TREATY WAS NEITHER AIMED AT THE SOVIET UNION, NOR FOR THAT MATTER WAS IT ANY OF GROMYKO'S BUSINESS. THIS UNYIELDING POSTURE -- POPULAR WITH THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AS WELL AS WITH THE CHINESE -- SHOULD SMOOTH THE WAY FOR NEW JAPANESE MOVES TOWARD PEKING. GROMYKO'S HARDER ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, FAR FROM DISTURBING GOJ, WAS WELCOMED BY SOME OFFICIALS WHO ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH DETENTE AND HAVE GAINED CONFIDENCE FROM THE PACIFIC DOCTRINE.

THE SMALL GIFTS THAT GROMYKO BORE WERE ALSO PLEASING TO THE JAPANESE. HIS WILLINGNESS TO REPRINT IN THE COMMUNIQUE THE KEY PORTION OF THE BREZHNEV-TANAKA DECLARATION OF 1973 IS SEEN AS ASSURANCE THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES HAS AT LEAST NOT SLIPPED. GROMYKO ALSO GAVE MILD ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE PROSPECT THAT BREZHNEV MIGHT VISIT JAPAN, ALTHOUGH THIS STILL SEEMS REMOTE.

GROMYKO WAS NONCOMMITTAL ON THE KEY FISHERIES ISSUE, WHICH THE JAPANESE REGARD AS THE PRINCIPAL PRESSURE POINT IN THE JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. HIS ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT SOME PROBLEMS EXIST IN THE BEHAVIOR OF SOVIET FISHERMEN OPERATING OFF THE JAPAN COAST MIGHT LEAD TO RESTRAINT THAT COULD EASE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THE GOJ TO EXTEND TO TWELVE MILES THE LIMITS OF JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL SEAS. BUT THE JAPANESE ARE FAR FROM SURE THAT GROMYKO WILL COUNSEL RESTRAINT, BELIEVING IT AS LIKELY THAT SOVIETS WILL RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF EVEN TOUGHER BEHAVIOR ON FISHERIES MATTERS AS A LEVER AGAINST JAPAN.

ECONOMIC ISSUES WERE BROACHED BY SOVIETS ONLY IN
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BRIEFEST AND MOST GENERAL TERMS.

FROM PUBLIC RELATIONS STANDPOINT, GROMYKO'S TRIP WAS A DUD. THE JAPANESE IMAGE OF GROMYKO HAS ALWAYS BEEN DOUR AND UNATTRACTIVE, AND HE DID NOTHING TO CHANGE THAT DURING HIS STAY IN TOKYO. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF HIS ARRIVAL WITH THE EMOTIONAL JAPANESE OUTPOURING IN RESPONSE TO CHOU EN-LAI'S DEATH ONLY MADE MATTERS WORSE. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING IS ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S TALKS IN TOKYO, BASED ON EMBASSY CONVERSATIONS WITH CONTACTS IN GOJ, AND PARTICULARLY ON DISCUSSIONS WITH FONOFF FIRST EAST EUROPEAN DIVDIR ARAI AND TREATIES BUREAU DIVDIR OWADA. ARAI WAS WORKING LEVEL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING JAPANESE LEADERS FOR GROMYKO VISIT AND ATTENDED ALL THE MEETINGS AND EVENTS. OWADA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING TRACK OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR, LAW OF THE SEA, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE PRC AND GAVE HIM ACCESS TO ALL GROMYKO'S CONVERSATIONS WITH FONMIN MIYAZAWA.

2. GROMYKO'S TOUGH SIDE - THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
THE ISSUE CAME UP IN ALL CONVERSATIONS GROMYKO HAD IN TOKYO. THE PATTERN AND SUBSTANCE WAS THE SAME AS THAT REPORTED REFTELS, WITH THE JAPANESE DEMANDING RETURN OF ALL FOUR NORTHERN ISLANDS, AND GROMYKO RESPONDING THAT SOVIET UNION HAD DIFFERENT VIEW OF PROBLEM, BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS QUESTION. MEANWHILE, HE ADVOCATED CONCLUSION OF SEPARATE TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND USSR AS INTERIM MEASURE. GROMYKO ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESS FOR SUCH AN INTERIM TREATY IF THE JAPANESE WERE NOT RESPONSIVE. THEY WERE NOT.

3. WHILE THESE EXCHANGES WERE SINGULARLY STERILE IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE, THEY REPRESENT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN TOKYO AT THIS HIGH A LEVEL, A FACT WHICH THE JAPANESE POINT TO WITH SOME SATISFACTION. MORE IMPORTANT, CONFIDENTIAL

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GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE ENABLED THE JAPANESE LEADERS TO ADOPT A HARD LINE IN RESPONSE WHICH HAS MADE THEM LOOK WELL IN FRONT OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AUDIENCES. OUR SOURCES IMPLY A STRONG SENSE OF RELIEF THAT GROMYKO WAS AS INTRANSIGENT AS EXPECTED. FOR HIM TO ARRIVE WITH SOME MAJOR CONCESSIONS ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION WOULD HAVE PLACED THE GOJ IN AN UNWANTED QUANDARY.

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4. JAPANESE-PRC RELATIONS

GROMYKO WARNINGS AGAINST CONCLUSION OF A PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC WERE A FEATURE OF EVERY MAJOR CONVERSATION, AND OF GROMYKO'S PARTING PRESS CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO FIRST EAST EUROPEAN DIVDIR ARAI THREATENING FORMULA USED COMMONLY BY THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER WENT ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS:

THE USSR HAS ALWAYS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF COOPERATION AND GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS TOWARD JAPAN.

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IF JAPAN SIGNS A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH THE PRC ON CHINESE TERMS BY INCLUDING A CLAUSE OPPOSING

HEGEMONY, THAT WOULD MEAN THAT JAPAN WOULD HAVE REVIEWED ITS POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE USSR WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FOLLOW ITS TRADITIONAL POLICY OF COOPERATION AND GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS TOWARD JAPAN.

5. DURING THE CONVERSATION WITH PRIMIN MIKI, WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS WAS THE TOUGHEST, GROMYKO THREATENED TO REVIEW SOVIET-JAPAN RELATIONS SHOULD JAPAN ADOPT FOLLOW CHINESE LEAD ON HEGEMONY QUESTION.

6. THE JAPANESE POSITION WAS SIMILARLY CONSISTENT, WITH JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS REPEATEDLY MAKING THE POINT THAT A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH PEKING WAS A PURELY BILATERAL MATTER AIMED AT NO THIRD PARTY. OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONY IS AN INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE OF PEACE, IN THE JAPANESE VIEW.

7. OUR IMPRESSION IS GROMYKO'S WARNING PLACED NO PARTICULAR CONSTRAINTS ON THE JAPANESE VIS-A-VIS FUTURE MOVES TOWARD THE CHINESE.

8. ON THE CONTRARY, THE CHANCE TO EXPLAIN THEIR POSITION DIRECTLY AND FORTHRIGHTLY TO GROMYKO MAY MAKE THE JAPANESE FEEL FREER TO MOVE. THEY HAVE CERTAINLY FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF FORM. FURTHERMORE, THE JAPANESE PRESS AND PUBLIC ENJOY THE PICTURE OF THEIR LEADERS REFUSING TO KNUCKLE UNDER IN FACE OF SOVIET THREATS, AND WE GATHER FROM JAN 15 NCNA THAT THE CHINESE DO TOO. PRIMIN MIKI MADE IT CLEAR AT HIS FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' CLUB APPEARANCE THE DAY GROMYKO LEFT THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO COMPLETE THE PFT WITH THE CHINESE. OUR GUESS IS THAT THE GOMYKO VISIT WILL MAKE THE PROCESS SOMEWHAT EASIER. (WE PLAN TO EXAMINE IN GREATER DETAIL THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PFT IN A SUBSEQUENT CABLE.)

9. SOVIET-US RELATIONS

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DURING EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, NONE OF WHICH WERE COVERED IN ANY DETAIL IN BRIEFINGS TO PRESS, ARAI NOTED A COOLNESS IN GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAD NOT BEEN EVIDENT DURING MIYAZAWA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW A YEAR AGO. SOVIET FONMIN TOLD JAPANESE THAT NO SOONER HAD US AND USSR AGREED TO GUIDELINES FOR SALT -II THAN US BEGAN DEVELOPING NEW WEAPONS, INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILE. US ATTITUDE IS TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOVIET UNION FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH, HE CONTINUED,

NOTING THAT US MILITARY PARTICULARLY IN FAVOR OF HARD
LINE TOWARD MOSCOW.

10. MIYAZAWA INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT NATIONAL
STRENGTH SEEMED A NECESSARY INGREDIENT OF DETENTE,
AND THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY NATURAL FOR BOTH THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE US TO WANT TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER
FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

11. GROMYKO TOLD JAPANESE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER LIKELY
TO VISIT MOSCOW THIS MONTH TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS
ON ISSUE, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO FORESEE OUTCOME
OF DISCUSSIONS.

12. ASKED ABOUT USSR ATTITUDE TOWARD DETENTE,
GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT PROCESS OF DETENTE BY NO
MEANS EASY. FROM LONG-RANGE VIEWPOINT USSR QUITE
OPTIMISTIC, HE CONTINUED. THOUGH THERE ARE FORCES
IN THE US AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD PARTICULARLY
CHINA WHICH ARE OPPOSED, PROCESS OF DETENTE WILL BE
ADVANCED AS LONG AS US ADMINISTRATION STANDS FIRM.

13. GROMYKO TOLD JAPANESE THAT SOVIETS VIEW PACIFIC
DOCTRINE WITH SOME CONCERN. SOVIETS HAVE LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS IN PACIFIC BASIN, AND ARE WORRIED THAT
DOCTRINE WILL GIVE COMFORT TO CHINESE, WHO HAVE
HEGEMONISTIC AMBITIONS IN REGION. GROMYKO ALSO SAID
THAT USSR CONCERNED THAT US ATTITUDE TOWARD
PRC HAS BECOME TOO SYMPATHETIC, ANOTHER SOURCE
OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO PEKING.

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14. KOREA

GROMYKO MADE PRO FORMA STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR
KIM IL-SUNG'S POLICIES ON KOREAN PENINSULA. WITH-
DRAWAL OF ALL US TROOPS REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT
PEACE AND STABILITY THERE. ASKED ABOUT ATTITUDE
TOWARD CROSS-RECOGNITION. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT PLAN
WAS "TOO COMPLICATED TO BE REALISTIC." (ARAI
ASKED ESPECIALLY THAT WE NOT PASS DESCRIPTION OF
SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD CROSS RECOGNITION TO ROK.)

15. ANGOLA

GROMYKO TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT THE ORIGINAL SOURCE
OF TROUBLE IN ANGOLA WAS SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION.
SOVIETS ONLY HELPING NEW GOVERNMENT, AND WHAT,
HE ASKED, WAS WRONG WITH THAT? WERE THE USSR TO ADOPT
POLICY OF HELPING ALL FACTIONS IN DISPUTE, THEY
WOULD BE GUILTY OF SAME STUPIDITY AS OTHER FOREIGN
POWERS WHO SENT AID TO WHITE AS WELL AS RED FORCES

IN SOVIET UNION AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

16. JAPANESE LISTENED POLITELY TO GROMYKO'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUT WERE NOT ABOUT TO GIVE HIM MUCH SUPPORT. HALF OF SOVIET DRAFT COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED LANGUAGE DESCRIBING SOVIET POSITIONS ON WORLD ISSUES. THE JAPANESE REFUSED TO INCLUDE ANY OF IT, RESTRICTING MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN COMMUNIQUE TO BLAND SENTENCE STATING THAT BOTH SIDES HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL TOPICS.

17. SOME OFFICIALS, LIKE ARAI, WELCOMED HARDER SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD US. THEY HAD FOUND FIRM STANCE AGAINST SOVIETS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY ON EARLIER OCCASIONS WHEN SOVIETS ARGUED THAT SINCE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH US WERE EXCELLENT JAPANESE HAD NO EXCUSE FOR BEING DIFFICULT. THESE OFFICIALS DERIVE COMFORT AND CONFIDENCE FROM PACIFIC DOCTRINE, BELIEVING THAT SOVIETS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE CONCILIATORY IN LONG RUN IF FACED WITH CLEAR PROSPECT OF DEVELOPING ENTENTE BETWEEN US, JAPAN AND PRC.

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18. THE SOFTER SIDE-COMMUNIQUE

AS REPORTED REFTEL TOKYO 581, JAPANESE CONSIDER COMMUNIQUE SOMETHING OF AN ACHIEVEMENT. GROMYKO'S WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT QUOTATION OF LANGUAGE IN BREZHNEV-TANAKA DECLARATION OF 1973 RELEVANT TO TERRITORIAL QUESTION IS SEEN AS ASSURANCE THAT JAPANESE POSITION HAS NOT SLIPPED DESPITE WORRIES TO CONTRARY. ARAI TOLD US THAT MIYAZAWA HAD MADE STRONG EFFORT TO HAVE SAME PASSAGE QUOTED IN COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING MIYAZAWA VISIT TO MOSCOW IN JANUARY 1975, BUT THAT GROMYKO HAD REFUSED.
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19. BREZHNEV VISIT

IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION WITH PRIMIN MIKI, GROMYKO SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO "STUDY VISIT-TO-JAPAN PROBLEM CONCRETELY, AFTER THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS." ARAI COMMENTED THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS SLIGHTLY MORE POSITIVE THAN PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT. WHILE PROSPECTS FOR VISIT STILL REMOTE, POSSIBILITY REMAINS ALIVE.

20. FISHERIES AND THE TWELVE MILE LIMIT

TREATIES DIV DIR OWADA TOLD US THAT THE FISHERIES ISSUE CAME UP TWICE. DURING JAN 10 MEETING, MIYAZAWA TOLD GROMYKO THAT DESPITE OCTOBER JAPAN-SOVIET FISHERIES AGREEMENT SOME SOVIET FISHERMEN WERE DESTROYING GEAR NEAR JAPANESE WATERS. HE EXPLAINED THAT FISHING RIGHTS GRANTED JAPANESE COMPANIES COVERED AN AREA WHICH EXTENDS TO TWELVE MILES FROM THE JAPANESE COAST. MIYAZAWA ASKED THAT THE SOVIETS LIMIT THEIR FISHING ACTIVITIES TO AREAS TWELVE MILES BEYOND THE JAPANESE COAST.

21. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT SOVIET FISHERMEN HAD BEEN OPERATING ON HIGH SEAS IN CASES INVOLVED. HE RECOGNIZED THAT PROBLEMS EXIST IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS OF SOVIET FISHERMEN NEAR JAPAN.

22. ON JAN 12 AGRICULTURE MINISTER ABE JOINED

MIYAZAWA IN TALKS AND MADE SIMILAR BUT MORE DETAILED PITCH TO GROMYKO, STRESSING POINT THAT JAPANESE DOMESTIC FISHING RIGHTS EXTEND TO AREAS UP TO TWELQVE MILES OFFSHORE.

23. GROMYKO, IN EFFECT, BRUSHED ABE ASIDE, SAYING THAT DETAILED CASES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BY GRIEVANCE BOARD ESTABLISHED BY FISHERIES AGREEMENT. HE PROMISED TO APPOINT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO BOARD SO THAT CONSIDERATION OF CASES COULD BEGIN.

24. AFTER ABE DEPARTED, MIYAZAWA EXPLAINED TO GROMYKO THAT GOJ UNDER STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO EXTEND
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TERRITORIAL SEAS TO TWELVE MILES, AND AS CONSEQUENCE IS STUDYING MATTER SERIOUSLY. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS FROM JAPANESE PRESS AND WAS GRATEFUL FOR MIYAZAWA'S EXPOSITION. HE HAD NO COMMENT ON WHAT IF ANY LEGISLATION JAPAN OUGHT TO ADOPT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, AS LONG AS ACTION BY GOJ DID NOT TOUCH ON RIGHTS AND RULES ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY FREE NAVIGATION OF STRAITS, SPECIFICALLY TSUGARU AND TSUSHIMA.

25. MIYAZAWA MADE NO COMMENT IN REPLY.
OWADA COMMENTED THAT NOTHING IN THESE CONVERSATIONS WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR EXTENSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS. HOWEVER, IF SOVIETS RESTRICT FISHING ACTIVITIES TO AREA BEYOND TWELVE MILES, PRESSURE WILL RECEDE. OWADA FEELS GROMYKO COMMITTED HIMSELF TO NOTHING AND PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT ARE NOT VERY CLEAR. ARAI, WHO REGARDS JAPAN AS EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURE ON FISHERIES TENDS TO THINK SOVIETS WILL RESERVE POSSIBILITY ON EVEN ROUGHER BEHAVIOR ON FISHERIES MATTERS AS FUTURE LEVER AGAINST JAPAN.

26. ECONOMIC ISSUES

BEFORE GROMYKO VISIT, SOVIETS TOLD JAPANESE THAT A JOINT ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WOULD BE A DESIRABLE OUTCOME OF MINISTERIAL TALKS. THE JAPANESE DEMURRED ON GROUNDS THAT SUFFICIENT PREPARATION TIME NOT AVAILABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, ECONOMIC ISSUES NOT RAISED IN TALKS BETWEEN GROMYKO AND MIYAZAWA. GROMYKO DID HOWEVER, MAKE GENERAL STATEMENT OF MUTUAL BENEFITS STEMMING FROM JOINT COOPERATION IN SIBERIAN PROJECTS, BUT LIMITED REMARKS TO THAT.

27. ATMOSPHERICS

ARAI DESCRIBED MIYAZAWA AS CONDUCTING HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO IN A "CONVERSATIONAL WAY" WHICH AVOIDED THE

APPEARANCE OF NEGOTIATION OR CONFRONTATION. MIKI'S
TALK WAS SOMEWHAT MORE HEATED, WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER STATING JAPANESE POSITIONS MORE BADLY. GROMYKO
WAS HIS USUAL SERIOUS SELF.

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29. PUBLIC IMPACT

THE JAPANESE IMAGE OF GROMYKO HAS ALWAYS BEEN DOUR AND
UNATTRACTIVE, THE EPITOMY OF THE INTRASIGENT RUSSIAN.
THE MEDIA IN TOKYO CALL HIM "MR. NYET." NOTHING HE DID
IN TOKYO THIS TIME SERVED TO CHANGE THAT IMAGE. HIS
PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE DEPARTURE, WHICH FEATURED SOME
FIST SHAKING AS REPORTERS EVOKED IN SOME JAPANESE MINDS
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND HIS SHOE. IN FAIRNESS TO THE
SOVIET FONMIN, THE TIMING OF HIS VISIT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
WORSE, COMING AT A TIME WHEN PRESS AND MEDIA WERE OVERFLOWING
WITH EMOTIONAL TRIBUTES TO CHINESE PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI,
WHO DIED JUST BEFORE GROMYKO ARRIVED.
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